Procedures for awarding the two types of derogatory administrative discharges to enlisted personnel are governed by a 1965 Department of Defense directive. 20 Pursuant to the directive a General Discharge may be issued for a number of reasons. The service member's military record may be judged inadequate to merit an Honorable Discharge.
1
His discharge may be for the "Convenience of the Government" 22 or for dependency, hardship, minority, or disability. 2 3 The service member may be "unsuitable," i.e., he is considered to demonstrate inaptitude, 2 4 character and behavior disorders, 2 5 apathy, 26 enuresis, alcoholism, financial irresponsibility, or homosexual tendencies. -7 Finally, a General Discharge may be awarded for the same reasons for which an Undesirable Discharge could issue. 28 The 1965 directive gives members of the services no right to a hearing to challenge the issuance L. REV. 917 (1957) Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) . Legislative attempts to reform the system have nevertheless proven unsuccessful. Bills introduced within the last ten years, none of which were even reported out of committee, are: S. 2247, H.R. 9918, H.R. 10422, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1266 , H.R. 943, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969 ; S. 2009 , 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967 ; S. 745-762, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ; S. 2002 -2019 , 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963 . All the Senate bills were introduced by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina who favors extensive revision of the administrative discharge procedures. See Ervin, Military Administrative Discharges: Due Process in the Doldrums, 10 SAN DIEco L. REv. 9 (1973) .
20. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive No. 1332.14 (1965, current through Change 5 of August 13, 1969) , 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41 (1972) . The statutory authority for administrative discharges derives from 10 U.S.C. § 1169 (1970) , which provides that administrative discharge of regular enlisted personnel before expiration of term of service can be accomplished only "as prescribed by the Secretary concerned" or "as otherwise provided by law," and 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) , which gives the "head of [a] . . . military department" authority to issue regulations generally for "the conduct of its employees." Other statutes govern administrative discharge of certain officers. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § § 3781-3787, 3791-3797 (1970) . These procedures are not significantly fairer than those for enlisted personnel. See note 42 infra. For a critique of the present regulatory system, see Lynch, supra note 19.
21. 32 C.F.R. § 41.5(b) (1972) .
. Id. § 41.6(b) . 23. Id. § § 41.6(d) , (e), (f). 24. Id. § 4 1.6(g)(1). 25. Id. § 41.6(g)(2). 26. Id. § 41.6(g)(3). 27. Id. § 41.6(g). 28. Id. § § 41.6(i) , (j). DoD Directive No. 1332.14 specifies that in such cases an Undesirable Discharge should be awarded "unless the particular circumstances in a given case warrant a General or Honorable discharge." 32 C.F.R. § 41.7(c)(2) (1972).
22.
of a General Discharge, except in the case of an unsuitability discharge where the serviceman has eight or more years of continuous active military service.
9
The second and more serious type of derogatory administrative separation, the Undesirable Discharge, may be awarded for any of four reasons. 3 0 The first, resignation in lieu of court-martial, resembles plea bargaining but without the supervision and protection in the acceptance of pleas provided by a military judge under the UCMJ. 3 1 The second, unfitness, encompasses a variety of quasi-criminal actions, such as drug abuse, sexual perversion, and frequent difficulties with civil or military authorities. 32 The third category, misconduct, includes civil conviction for a crime carrying more than a one-year maximum sentence or involving moral turpitude, fraudulent enlistment, and unauthorized absence for one year or more. The fourth, security, covers activities ranging from disclosure of secret data to behavior "which tend [s] to show that the member is not reliable or trustworthy."
33
A serviceman threatened with an Undesirable Discharge under the last three categories-unfitness, misconduct, and security-has the right to a predischarge hearing before an administrative discharge board.a3
29.
Only the Navy and Marine Corps strictly adhere to the directive. The Army requires that a hearing be granted in all cases which could lead to a discharge for unsuitability. AR 635-212 6, 10. The Air Force uses a hybrid system, tempering the eight year cut-off with exceptions when certain rank is attained and for other reasons. AFM 39-12 2-6, 2-8. In all cases, however, ex-servicemen may challenge discharges issued to them before two sets of military administrative tribunals. See pp. 41-42 infra.
30. DoD Directive No. 1332.14 (1965, current through Change 5 of August 13, 1969), 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41 (1972) .
31. When a guilty plea is accepted, the elements of the charged offense must be explained to the accused and the military judge must be satisfied "not only that the accused understands the meaning and effect of his plea and admits the allegations to which he has pleaded guilty but also that he is voluntarily pleading guilty because he is convinced that he is in fact guilty." MCM, supra note 6, 70(b) . See, e.g., United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971) ; United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M. R. 247 (1969) . These protections are not required when an accused is allowed to resign for the good of the service.
32. 32 C.F.R. § 41.6(i) (1972) . The other reasons for discharge for unfitness are shirking, a pattern showing a dishonorable failure to pay just debts, a pattern showing dishonorable failure to contribute adequate support to dependents, and unsanitary habits, a euphemism for repeated venereal disease infections. Undesirable Discharge for contraction of venereal disease violates DoD policy against taking " [p] unitive measures, whether direct or indirect, whether administrative or ostensibly imposed for public health reasons" against service members who contract such diseases. TB MED 230, NAVMED P-5052-11A, AFP 161-1-12, Treatment and Management of Venereal Disease 2 (1965) (Joint publication of Army, Navy and Air Force). 33. DoD Directive No. 5210.9, Military Personnel Security Program, Art. VIII, § (c)(3)(e) (1956 , current through Change 3 of July 12, 1965 . Section (c)(3) contains the specific criteria for security discharge.
34. 32 C.F.R. § 41.7(d)(1)(i) (1972) . The Board can recommend either retention of the serviceman or the issuance of an Undesirable, General or even Honorable Discharge.
Id. § § 41.8(b)(1), (2). When an Undesirable Discharge is issued as the result of resignation
Deficiencies in the rules governing such hearings, however, render them less than adequate safeguards of the serviceman's rights.
The hearing takes place before a board ol three officers, none of whom need have legal training or expertise. 35 The respondent is entitled to military counsel, 36 but this requirement may be of little avail, since the hearing board is not bound by rules of evidence. 3 7 In addition, the board cannot compel witnesses to testify before it, 3 8 necessitating frequent reliance on written statements. 9 Thus the respondent often has no chance to confront or cross-examine persons testifying against him. In some situations, in fact, the board may be briefed on the government's position before the hearing 40 and may receive secret testimony never made available to the serviceman. 41 A further deficiency of some hearing procedures is that the Government is not required to bear the burden of proof. 42 After the hearing the board's in lieu of court-martial, the serviceman need not be given a predischarge hearing if, having had the opportunity to consult with counsel, the serviceman certifies in writing that he understands the consequences of his action. Id. § 41.7(d)(5).
35. Id. § 41.8(a). DoD Directive No. 1332.14 specifies only that members of such boards must be "experienced."
36. 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(c)(1) (1972) . Only the Air Force requires that this counsel be a lawyer, AFM 39-12 1 1-4(f). The other services allow nonlawyers to represent respondents when an "appropriate authority" certifies that a lawyer is not available and sets forth the qualifications of the substituted nonlawyer counsel. This practice is authorized by DoD Directive No. 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(k) (1972). 37. See 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(b) (1972). The Air Force, which is the most scrupulous of the services in setting evidentiary standards, provides only that "general observance of the essence" of the rules of evidence will "promote orderly procedure." Absent from its list of the "essence" are the rules requiring determination of the voluntariness of a confession and independent evidence of guilt and barring use of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 11-1, Boards of Officers For Conducting Investigations 9 (1953, current through Change ll-IA of May 28, 1963), 32 C.F.R. § 866.9(b) (1972) . Even this diluted "essence" need not be observed and an Air Force board may consider ex parte affidavits and unsworn writings. Id. § 866.9(a).
38. 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(c)(3) (1972). Although no specific statute gives subpoena power to administrative discharge boards, the Court of Inquiry Article of the UCMJ could be used for this purpose. Article 135, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 935(f) (1970 (1972) . The enlisted discharge regulations of the other services are generally silent on the subject, although the Navy regulation governing discharge findings and recommendations need not be disclosed to the serviceman, 43 who thus may not discover factual errors in them. Finally, the hearing rules fail to adequately insulate the procedure from command influence. Thus, an officer of sufficient rank may not only institute derogatory discharge proceedings but also pick members of the hearing board.
44
After the board has made its findings and recommendations, they are reviewed by the "Discharge Authority," an official authorized to take final action with respect to specified types of discharges. 4 u This official may direct issuance of the type of discharge recommended by the board 4 0 or he may order a more favorable discharge; 4 7 he cannot, however, order a less favorable discharge than that recommended. 4 8 However, even if the board has recommended retention of the serviceman, the Discharge Authority may order an Honorable or General Discharge. 4 9 Finally, the Discharge Authority may suspend execution of an administrative discharge to afford a serviceman time to "demonstrate successful rehabilitation" 5 0 or he may disregard a discharge recommendation altogether and order retention of the serviceman.5 1 After his separation from the armed forces has been ordered and executed, 52 an ex-serviceman may apply for relief from errors leading to his administrative discharge before two types of administrative refor security reasons specifies that "[n]o burden of proof whatsoever shall be borne by the Government." Sec. Nav. Inst. 5521.6A, App. 3, 6. The Air Force requires a regular officer being processed for derogatory administrative discharge to bear the burden of showing that he should be retained, AFR 36-2, Officer Personnel, Administrative Discharge Procedures (Unfitness, Unacceptable Conduct, or In The Interest of National Security), 24(a) (1971, current view bodies. The first-level review body, the Discharge Review Board, 53 may investigate, either on its own motion or on request, the discharge of a former service member at any time during the fifteen years following discharge. It must grant a personal hearing to any former service member who requests one and, in its discretion, may allow witnesses to present evidence either in person or by affidavit. The board is empowered to reclassify a discharge or to issue a new discharge, subject to the review of the Secretary of the service.
4
Should a former member be denied relief by a Discharge Review Board or should he demand relief-such as reinstatement or a money settlement-which is beyond the power of a Discharge Review Board, he may apply to the Board for the Correction of Military Records (BCMR) of his service for relief. The statute creating these secondlevel review bodiesl 5 authorizes the Secretary of each service, acting through civilian employees, to "correct any military record ... when * . . necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice." 5 6 BCMR's, in performance of this function, may thus correct erroneously issued discharges. Thereafter the military department is authorized to pay back wages and other pecuniary benefits which become due as a result of the correction and the Secretary of the service may reinstate the former serviceman.5 7 Although the statute allows BCMR intervention before a discharge is issued, the BCMR's generally will not rule on an application until 53. 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970) . Each service has established such a body. The implementing regulations of the services are similar. All provide that a Discharge Review Board will consist of five commissioned officers on active duty, that the rules of evidence do not apply, and that no expense for a petitioner's counsel or witnesses will be paid by the Government. They all provide that the board may not revoke any discharge or reinstate any person in the military service. The Army regulation appears at 32 C.F.R. § 581. 2 (1973) ; the Air Force regulation is at 52 C.F.R. Pt. 865, subpart B (1972) ; the Navy's appears at 32 C.F.R. Pt. 724 (1972) .
54. There has been much controversy concerning the power of the Secretary to deny a board's finding in favor of a petitioner. See note 61 infra.
10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970).
56. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1970 63 and of military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory 6 4 are excluded from the scope of the Act, its legislative history 65 and numerous judicial decisions 6 indicate that it applies to other military functions, including administrative discharge proceedings. It empowers courts, inter alia, to set aside agency action found to be "contrary to constitutional right, 58. The Board for the Correction of Naval Records makes an exception to this rule in that it will consider an application from an officer whose performance is reported as "unsatisfactory" for promotion purposes under 10 U.S.C. § 6384 (1970) power, privilege, or immunity," "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right," "without observance of procedure required by law," "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case . . . reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute," or "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. ' 67 A. The Constitutional Claim: Violation of Due Process
Civilian Standards
It seems likely that many administrative discharge procedures would be deemed unconstitutional if judged by due process standards applicable to civilians. Both the Undesirable Discharge and the General Discharge stigmatize the recipient, 68 yet the regulations governing their issuance do not mandate confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.
09
That such procedures, if applied to civilians, would offend due process rights emerges primarily from Greene v. McElroy. 7 0 In Greene the Supreme Court set forth, albeit in dicta, due process restrictions on government action resulting in job loss under stigmatizing conditions. Greene, a civilian employee of a defense contractor, was dismissed by his employer after his security clearance was revoked by Defense Department officials. 7 1 Afforded a hearing after the revocation and informed by letter that the basis for the revocation was his alleged subversive activities, Greene was neither told the names of persons who had made statements against him nor allowed to view their statements. He had, furthermore, no opportunity to confront witnesses against him at the hearing. As a result of the revocation of 67. APA § § 10(e)(B)(1-5), 5 U.S.C. § § 706(2) (A-E) (1970) . APA § 10(e)(B)(6), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1970), allows a court to overturn administrative fact findings "unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court." This provision, however, generally applies only when such a trial is specifically authorized by statute. See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619 n.17 (1966) . There is no statute giving such a right in judicial review of administrative discharge proceedings.
68. The services freely admit that both create substantial prejudice in civilian life, see pp. 9-10 supra, and a recent empirical study bears this out. See Jones, supra note 8. Although the reason for discharge does not appear on the discharge certificate, such information is not difficult for a potential employer to discover. his clearance, Greene not only lost his job but was unable to obtain comparable employment elsewhere.
72
In voiding the withdrawal of Greene's security clearance, the Supreme Court restricted its precise holding to a narrow ground: The Department of Defense was not specifically authorized by statute or executive order to promulgate security clearance regulations "under which affected persons may lose their jobs and may be restrained in following their chosen professions" without allowing the person to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 73 But the Court went on to criticize the procedure on constitutional grounds, stating, inter alia, that
[w]here governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue .... We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination . . . . This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases .. . but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory action were under scrutiny .... 74 Since the Court was able to achieve an appropriate result by construing statutes and executive orders, it eschewed a constitutional holding. 75 The extensive due process analysis provided by Chief Justice Warren nonetheless makes it apparent that the Court was prepared to decide the case on constitutional grounds if a narrower holding had not been available. 7 This inference is strengthened by subsequent Supreme Court decisions which have established that before government action may effectively deprive an individual of employment in his chosen profes- Since administrative discharges inflict comparable penalties without affording servicemen the rights of confrontation and cross-examination, a court applying civilian due process standards clearly would find administrative discharge procedures constitutionally defective.
This conclusion is unaffected by exceptions and qualifications in due process doctrine which somewhat limit its application in the area of government action impinging on employment opportunities. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, ' the Court refused to declare unconstitutional the withdrawal of a security badge from an employee of a military concessionaire, even though forfeiture of the badge entailed job loss. The Court held that the employee had no due process right to disclosure of the reason for the withdrawal or a hearing to refute evidence against her 82 on the ground that "this [was] not a case where government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity."
Thus, if derogatory administrative discharges did not have such deleterious effects, a serviceman could not mount a viable due process challenge, since due process does not otherwise limit the government's discretion to dismiss its own employees. 8 4 Such discharges, however, are more than simple dismissals: They are actions which create a seri- 
Applicability of the Fifth Amendment to Military Administrative Discharge Proceedings
It is thus hardly surprising that Greene initially appeared to bode well for servicemen's efforts to extend traditional due process protections to administrative discharge proceedings. In Bland v. Connally 8 7 and Davis v. Stahr, 88 the first post-Greene decisions to deal with such discharges, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed administrative discharges given for security reasons. Both discharge actions were based entirely on "confidential" information not disclosed to the person discharged. 9 The dischargees challenged the right of the services to award them derogatory administrative discharges without adhering to minimum due process standards and sought to have their discharges reclassified as honorable.
The court disposed of both cases on the same narrow basis that the Supreme Court had utilized in Greene. Determining that there had been no express congressional grant of authority to establish facts by secret evidence, the Davis court held that "where the denial of the right of confrontation can be so prejudicial, we think any cancellation of the right must come from Congress and be explicit." 9 0 Though the derogatory administrative discharges of the two men were thus voided on the ground of insufficient authorization, the court relied heavily on the broad constitutional pronouncement in Greene as the underlying rationale for its action. 9 1 Unfortunately, another line of cases has construed Greene less favorably for servicemen's due process challenges to administrative discharge provisions. In Reed v. Franke 92 a Navy non-commissioned officer with more than eighteen years of service was alleged to have collided with a Rear Admiral's car while driving under the influence of alcohol. It was ordered that he be given a General Discharge (apparently for alcoholism) without being afforded a predischarge hearing. 93 Vol. 83: 33, 1973 discharge could be executed, he brought suit, claiming that such summary procedures violated his constitutional due process rights. Noting that the Navy regulations under which Reed was discharged had been authorized by the President, 0 4 the court distinguished Greene on the ground that the Supreme Court there had "expressly refused to speculate on the constitutionality of the regulations had they been approved by Congress or the President." 9 5 The broader due process discussion in Greene was ignored.
The Reed court then argued that, in any event, the Navy provisions complied with the due process clause. This argument was clearly erroneous. The court theorized that Reed could demand a mandatory hearing before the Navy Discharge Review Board. This potential hearing, which could not occur until after discharge, 96 was said to satisfy due process requirements. 0 7 As authority for its due process holding the Reed court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc9 s and similar cases preceding it. 99 But Ewing and the other cases cited stand for the proposition that "no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final administrative order becomes effective."' 100 In Reed's case, however, the discharge would already have been effective by the time he had the opportunity to bring an appeal to the Discharge Review Board. 1 0 ' The question of what "process" is "due" aside, whatever due process safeguards are required must normally be afforded before an adverse administrative action takes effect. This has become perhaps clearer in the years since Reed, 10 2 but the proposition was by no means novel in 1961 when the Fourth Circuit decided the case.' 0 3 Thus, the Reed 94. All Navy regulations must be approved by the President. 10 U.S.C. § 6011 (1970 court's misuse of Ewing is perhaps more significant than it appears: Coupled with the court's unwillingness to consider the underlying due process rationale of Greene, 04 it may well reflect implicit doubt that civilian standards of due process protection extend to servicemen who are administratively discharged. 1 0 r Such doubt is hardly unfounded. Servicemen have never enjoyed all of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment itself exempts "cases arising in the land or naval forces" from the grand jury indictment requirement. 0 6 Early opinions interpreted this language to mean that members of the armed forces were completely beyond the protective ambit of the Fifth Amendment, 10 7 but in 1953 the Supreme Court held in Burns v. Wilson 08 that at a minimum the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment protects military personnel from "crude injustices" and lack of "rudimentary fairness" in courtmartial proceedings. 0 9
Burns failed to clarify the degree or type of due process protection enjoyed by servicemen," 0 and, to this date, the Supreme Court has not expanded or elucidated its Burns holding. Conclusions about the constitutional protection due servicemen must, therefore, remain somewhat tentative. 1 1 ' 104. 297 F.2d at 26. Reed and the cases following it reject by implication the notion that due process in this context requires, at some point at least, a right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, since post-discharge review bodies, lacking subpoena power, do not provide such opportunities to petitioners as a matter of right. 51-59 (1961) .
The Court itself has acknowledged a continuing lack of clarity in the area. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957) . In United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348 (1969) , the Court may have limited the implications of Burns somewhat. There the Court held that a claim based on an alleged violation of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964) , which provides that when a witness testifies for the United States, the Government may be required to produce "any statement" of the witness which relates to his testimony, did not rise to a constitutional level and thus did not even arguably justify collateral attack on a court-martial judgment.
111. A jurisdictional impediment has significantly restricted the development in civilian courts of due process standards applicable to servicemen. Most civilian court cases involving servicemen's assertions of due process rights have sought collateral re-
Vol. 83: 33, 1973
The Supreme Court's relative silence contrasts with the United States Court of Military Appeals' activism in defining the constitutional rights of those in the military. Created by Congress in 1950112 with jurisdiction limited to review of serious court-martial convictions, 1 13 this Article I court has long taken the position that "the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces."
114 And in practice the court has ensured that service members involved in court-martial proceedings enjoy nearly all the due process rights accorded civilians. 15 The due process guarantees enforced by the Court of Military Appeals have of course pertained exclusively to court-martial proceedings. The application of due process safeguards in the administrative discharge context thus requires significant doctrinal extrapolation. To infer that due process limitations on derogatory administrative pro- Rv. 1697 Rv. , 1740 Rv. -43 (1968 ceedings are constitutionally required, a court must first conclude that such serious harm may result from the proceedings that protections equivalent to those given in courts-martial are necessary.'" In a recent decision, Crowe v. Clifford, 1 17 the Sixth Circuit proved unwilling to take that step. Without dealing with the severity of harm question, the court held that a challenge to a derogatory administrative discharge mounted on the basis of a due process claim" s was defective since "principles which govern criminal trials are not applicable to administrative discharge hearings ... , But the Crowe court's cramped notion of a Fifth Amendment due process clause applicable exclusively to criminal trials is inconsistent with repeated Supreme Court assertions that due process protections cover "not only . . . criminal cases . . . but also . . . all types' of cases where administrative and regulatory action were under scrutiny .... ,,120
Fortunately, underlying doubt that due process safeguards apply to administrative discharge proceedings has not proven uniformly fatal 116. Recent Supreme Court decisions have stressed that due process requirements are triggered by the potential harm which a governmental action may cause. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965 ). 120. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959 ; accord, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) . If the Crowe court was attempting to hold that plaintiff's demand for a constitutional right of confrontation was controlled by the Sixth Amendment, limited by its terms to criminal proceedings, rather than the Fifth Amendment, then the court failed to take adequate cognizance of Goldberg v. Kelly, which established a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair hearing before termination of state welfare benefits. The Court there held that due process required an opportunity at the hearing "to confront or cross-examine adverse witness," id. at 268. It thus laid to rest any residual doubt that the right of confrontation is not protected under the Fifth Amendment due process clause, as well as under the Sixth Amendment. The inevitable objection that Kelly was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, while Crowe involved the Fifth Amendment, is easily answered: The Kelly Court itself freely relied on Fifth Amendment due process decisions requiring confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses as support for its holding that confrontation was required in the welfare termination setting by the Fourteenth Amendment. id. at 269-70. It thus implied that the coverage of the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is coterminous with respect to rights of confrontation.
to subsequent assertions of due process claims by recipients of stigmatizing administrative discharges. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently held that the Army's extraction of a resignation for the good of the service (resulting in an Undesirable Discharge) from a service member undergoing psychiatric treatment was "indefensible by any acceptable standard of due process and elemental justice"' 121 and at least one court has applied ordinary courtmartial and criminal court rules to the admissibility of illegally seized evidence in administrative discharge proceedings.
122
Most active in defining due process rights of service members subjected to administrative discharge proceedings has been the Court of Claims, which has had more experience with military discharge cases than any other court because of its unique authority to award substantial amounts of back pay. hearted or negative view of the due process rights of servicemen exhibited by other courts. Given the extension of traditional due process rights to servicemen in the court-martial context, it seems proper to afford similar protection in the administrative discharge area. The consequences of an Undesirable Discharge, the most onerous of the administrative dismissals, are nearly identical to those of the Bad Conduct Discharge, which can be awarded only by a court-martial. 3 0 The award of a General Discharge likewise creates considerable disadvantage for the recipient' 3 ' and thus ought also to be accompanied by due process safeguards, particularly the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Countervailing Governmental Interests
Even if it is assumed that Fifth Amendment protections extend to the administrative discharge context, a possible impediment for plaintiffs asserting due process claims remains: the presence of countervailing governmental interests. Leading Supreme Court cases developing standards of civilian due process have stressed that in determining the procedural rights due an individual likely to be adversely affected by governmental action, a court must weigh not only the seriousness of the harm but also the countervailing government interest.
132
Military authorities argue that administrative discharges serve two distinct functions. First, they allow the efficient expulsion of both "troublemakers" whose presence threatens military discipline and service members whose performance does not measure up to minimum standards. 133 This interest in efficient discharge of the "unfit" would, of course, be adequately served by a system which did not affix stigmatizing labels to persons so discharged. of a single label for all administrative discharges, including the Honorable, "diminishes the value of the discharge to the man who has given honorable service. You need a way to characterize the service for what it truly is." ' 13 It is clear that the military also considers that discharge characterization provides disincentives for the misbehavior of "troublemakers."' 1 3 6 Resort to the less drastic means of awarding neutral label discharges, while not impinging upon the military's interest in speedy discharges, may conflict with this second interest.
The services' interests in effecting speedy discharges and in providing performance incentives and disincentives must be balanced against individual interests if a proper standard of due process is to be formulated."
37 Giving due consideration to military interests need not prevent a court from striking a balance which allows confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses by the dischargee. Courts have deemed important government interests insufficient to preclude the right of confrontation in other contexts. 1 8 And, significantly, in the specific context of administrative discharges, some courts have required that proceedings conform to normal due process standards, despite clear countervailing military interests." 9
B. Failure to Follow Statutory or Regulatory Procedures
Despite the fact that discharge regulations clearly ought to be brought within the strictures of the due process clause, courts have traditionally been unwilling to reach constitutional issues if they are able to achieve an appropriate result by construing statutes or administrative regulations. 40 Thus a number of successful challenges to derogatory administrative discharges have been decided on the basis of the military's own regulations.
If a service member ordered to receive an administrative discharge can prove that the military's failure to follow procedures required by statute or by its own regulations worked to his detriment in discharge proceedings, it is clear that he may obtain a judicial declaration that the discharge is invalid.
Section 10 of the APA codifies this doctrine in its mandate that the courts set aside administrative action taken "in excess of statutory authority"' 141 or "without observance of procedure required by law."'
42
The Supreme Court has held "that regulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, and that this principle holds even when the administrative action under review is discretionary in nature."' 4 Regulations validly promulgated have the force and effect of law; 44 thus, action taken by an administrative agency in contravention of its regulations is illegal, giving rise to a right to judicial determination of the validity of the action.1 4 5 Although closely related to considerations of due process, 14 the requirement that regulations be followed also developed independently as a "judicially evolved rule of administrative law.
'u47
That the rule applies to decisions by the military is beyond question. Complainants who proved violations of regulatory procedures have received favorable judgments in every reported case in which the validity of a military discharge was challenged on that basis.' ) ("violation by the military of its own regulations constitutes a violation of an individual's right to due process of law"); cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152-53 (1945) (regulations must be followed, in part, because they were "designed as safeguards against essentially unfair procedures").
147. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring and dissenting). In Vitarelli the rule was applied to invalidate a government employee's dismissal carried out in violation of relevant regulations. The Court found, though, that the employee could have been summarily dismissed had the regulations not been promulgated. This rule has been held not to apply to action taken in violation of regulations which "were not intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion .. 149 the Court of Claims voided the issuance of an Undesirable Discharge to a Marine sergeant who allegedly ran over and killed a Haitian civilian while he was driving drunk. The discharge was based solely on unsworn statements of Haitian civilians and the ex parte report of an officer sent to Haiti to investigate the accident. The court invalidated the discharge and awarded Conn back pay after finding that the Navy had failed to follow regulations which accorded a person subjected to a "one officer investigation" certain procedural rights, including the right to crossexamine witnesses against him. 10 A similar decision is Glidden v. United States, 151 where an airman had been given an Undesirable Discharge for homosexuality. He allegedly had been observed to commit a homosexual act by two unnamed policemen watching through a one-way mirror in a theater men's room. The only evidence introduced against him at his hearing was an investigative report based on their ex parte statements to Air Force investigators. The court construed an Air Force regulation generally applicable to administrative hearings to require in most cases that the Air Force produce witnesses against an individual being processed for administrative discharge:15 2 The right not to be convicted on hearsay, and to confront and cross-examine one's accusers, are basic, and are guaranteed by the Regulations involved, with exceptions not here relevant.' 5 3 of Mr. Justice Rehnquist in Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 354 (1972) , suggesting that the requirement that regulations be followed "might not carry over undiminished to the military services .... "
149. 376 F.2d 878 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 150. The services have sought to avoid the impact of such judgments concerning investigatory bodies. The Navy responded to Conn, for example, by changing the regulation. Compare 26 Fed. Reg. 11779 (1961) ("A party [to an investigation entitled to cross-examine adverse witnesses] is a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice . . . whose conduct or performance of duty is 'subject to inquiry'"), with 32 C.F.R. § 719.301(a) (1972) ("A 'party' is an individual who has properly been designated as such in connection with a court of inquiry or a formal fact-finding body"). The bame sort of administrative counterattack occurred as a result of Geiger v. Brown, 419 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1969) , where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Air Force Personnel Board was an investigative board governed by a regulation giving procedural rights to those appearing before such bodies (AFR 11-1), where "there is no explicit exception thereto," and that the procedures required by the regulations had not been followed. Contra, Keef v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 454, 469 (1968) . After the decision in Geiger the Air Force issued AFR 21-10, Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Counsel (1970), which created such an "explicit exception."
Id. 10.
151. 185 Ct. Cl. 515 (1968) . 152. The regulation was AFR 11-I. See note 37 supra. The court has, however, allowed the Air Force to introduce an affidavit over objection for the purpose of corroborating an undenied confession. See Waller v. United States, 461 F.2d 1273 (Ct. CI. 1972).
153. 185 Ct. Cl. at 521. To the claim that the police officers were confidential informants the court replied that "[p]rocedural regulations to protect confidential informants cannot be invoked to shield from confrontation and cross-examination material witnesses not properly so classed." Id. at 523.
Glidden's discharge was declared invalid and he was awarded back pay. 5 4
C. Evidentiary Standards
Two other bases for challenging derogatory administrative discharge action are contained in the evidentiary standards provided in § 10 of the APA which require courts to set aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case . . . reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." 55 The two standards thus set forth are not coextensive. While "[i]n all cases agency action must be set aside if the action is 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion' . . . ,"56 agency action under the APA can be set aside on the basis of the stricter "substantial evidence" test only when the test's requirements are found not satisfied in judicial review of the record of an agency hearing "provided by statute." 15 7 In the administrative discharge context the only pre-discharge hearings provided for by statute are those for certain Army and Air Force officers.' 5 8 Although post-discharge review of administrative discharge action is available through statutory Discharge Review Boards' 5 9 and Boards for the Correction of Military Records, 160 only the Discharge Review Board statute makes provision for hearings.' 1 Thus it is doubtful that the substantial evidence test set forth in § 10 of the APA is applicable except in cases involving such Army or Air Force officers or those in which a Discharge Review Board hearing has taken place before judicial review was sought. 162 The Army, however, requires by regulation that the fact findings of hearings before boards of officers of the type allowed or required by regulation in derogatory administrative discharge proceedings "must be supported by substantial evidence."' 6 Moreover, the overwhelming Although the substantial evidence test has thus been the evidentiary standard most often invoked by courts passing upon the validity of military administrative action, its applicability would be restricted if courts adopt a strict construction of § 10 of the APA. It is therefore important to determine not only when administrative action fails to satisfy the substantial evidence test but also when it may be successfully challenged as arbitrary and capricious.
In applying either standard a court must limit its consideration to the administrative record 1 9 and must "review the whole record or those parts cited by a party."' 70 At this point the two standards diverge. The Supreme Court has held that in determining whether an administrative action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion' a court "must consider whether the decision is based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."' 72 Some courts have stated that the standard is violated only when there is no evidence in the administrative record in support of a fact finding. 173 Whether or not the latter formulation is accurate, it is undeniable that most military administrative decisions that have been found to be arbitrary have been supported by very little evidence.
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Substantial evidence, on the other hand, is defined more expansively as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' 75 In deciding whether evidence in the administrative record is sufficient to support an administrative conclusion a court must "take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts" from it. O Although the substantial evidence test thus requires a more thorough and less restricted judicial review of findings and conclusions appearing in an administrative record than does the arbitrary or capricious test, it still falls far short of requiring such protections as due process demands in the context of derogatory administrative discharge proceedings. It does not require a court to set aside administrative findings supported only by hearsay testimony, even when contradicted by "live" witnesses, so long as the reviewing court is satisfied of the underlying validity and probative value of the hearsay evidence relied upon by the agency. S. 389, 410 (1971) . The case is discussed in The Supreme Court, 1970 Terfih, 85 HARv. L. REv. 37, 326-34 (1971 . A confession obtained by law enforcement officials without legally required warnings and other evidence normally suppressed in judicial proceedings by operation of the exclusionary rule, such as the fruits of an illegal search, of course face no impediment to their admission in administrative discharge proceedings in the substantial evidence rule, since their exclusion in judicial proceedings is based not on their lack of reliability or probative value, but upon independent considerations. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488 (1972 
A. Reviewability
While in an early decision, Reaves v. Ainsworthy' 7 9 the Supreme Court took the position that courts had "no power to review" administrative discharge decisions by the services, 8 0 in 1958 the Court clearly established that federal courts do indeed have such power. In that year it decided Harmon v. Brucker,1 8 ' which involved an Army reservist on inactive status who had received an Undesirable Discharge (later changed administratively to a General Discharge) because of pre-induction "subversive" activities. Harmon alleged, inter alia, that Army regulations allowing consideration of pre-service activities in determining the type of discharge to be issued were void as beyond statutory authority. 8 2 Both the district court and the court of appeals denied relief on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 83 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
[t]he District Court had not only jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction, but also the power to construe the statutes involved to determine whether the respondent did exceed his powers. If he did so judicial relief from this illegality would be available. 1 8 4 178. The existence of a substantive federal right does not imply that federal courts will have original jurisdiction to enforce that right. If violation of a federal statutory right were alleged, for instance, but the amount in controversy fell below $10,000, then a federal district court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit unless a special jurisdictional grant applied. 184. 355 U.S. at 582. It seems clear that the same holding on the statutory issue could not be made today. The discharge review board statute has been amended to allow While Harmon thus resolves the basic question of judicial power to review derogatory administrative discharges, it does not reveal the full range of jurisdictional bases upon which review may take place.
B. Jurisdictional Bases for Judicial Review
Before determining upon what basis to claim the jurisdiction of the court, a plaintiff must first decide what type of relief he wishes. The jurisdictional bases available to the serviceman seeking reinstatement in the service or discharge reclassification differ from those which may be used when monetary relief is sought.
Nonmonetary Relief
A service member desiring reinstatement or a reclassification of his discharge may bring suit only in a federal district court.ls 5 Subject matter jurisdiction in such a case might be alleged on the basis of any of three statutory provisions: Section 10 of the APA,SO the general federal question jurisdictional grant,18 7 or the jurisdictional provision for mandamus actions against federal officers.' 88 A common tactic in administrative discharge cases has been to seek jurisdiction under § 10 of the APA and judicial relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act.18 9 Of these two acts, only § 10 of the APA can be construed as a grant of subject matter jurisdiction. action ... is entitled to judicial review thereof."'", Though there has been some question whether § 10 is an independent grant of jurisdiction,' 0 2 the balance of authority holds that it is' 93 and courts reviewing administrative discharges have often asserted jurisdiction under it.'0 4
The Supreme Court, however, has not explicitly held that § 10 of the APA is a jurisdictional grant. In Rusk v. Cort' 95 it noted that the district court had relied upon the Declaratory Judgment Act and the APA "[i]n support of its jurisdiction"' 96 to review a final administrative determination by the Secretary of State. The Court stated cryptically that " [o] n their face the provisions of these statutes appear clearly to permit an action such as was brought here .... 19T No other basis of subject matter jurisdiction was suggested by the Court, nor was the district court's reliance on the APA criticized. Reading Rusk, the Second Circuit has concluded that "the Supreme Court apparently assumed" that § 10 of the APA was jurisdictional. 0 8 Some lower courts, however, have interpreted § 10 of the APA to be purely remedial and not jurisdictional. 99 In Reed v. Franke, 2°0 the only case involving administrative discharge in which jurisdiction un-, Vol. 83: 33, 1973 der § 10 of the APA was found lacking, a Navy non-commissioned officer mounted a constitutional challenge to the administrative procedures by which he was awarded a General Discharge without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the APA did not give it jurisdiction over such an action because the district court was "not called upon [in this instance] . . . to directly review administrative action, as is contemplated by the Act" but rather was to review the constitutionality of the procedure itself. 2 0 1 It thus did not hold that § 10 of the APA failed to confer any subject matter jurisdiction but only that the Act did not apply under the circumstances.
The second subject matter jurisdictional statute which might be invoked by servicemen seeking reinstatement or reclassification is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question jurisdictional grant. No reported case involving a challenge to administrative discharge, however, has explicitly relied on this statute as a basis for jurisdiction. No doubt the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement has been an impediment. Yet given the probability of deleterious effects of derogatory administrative discharges on future earning capacity, 20 3 surely an allegation that $10,000 is "in controversy" would withstand the test for dismissal, i.e., that it appear "to a legal certainty" that the jurisdictional amount is not involved. 20 4 Courts have used probable diminution of future earnings in other contexts to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1331.2 05 The $10,000 requirement aside, it seems clear that § 1331 would provide jurisdiction for challenges to derogatory administrative discharges in which violation of a regulation, a statute, or a constitutional provision were alleged. Whether or not § 10 of the APA is a jurisdictional grant, 20 0 it offers a remedial basis for judicial relief in the face of improper agency action. Since the APA is a federal law, a claim 283, 289 (1938) . Indeed, it is now questionable whether courts pay more than purely ritual attention to the jurisdictional amount requirement -in such cases. See, e.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, The third jurisdictional basis is 28 U.S.C. § 1361:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 208 This section, however, may be less satisfactory than § 10 of the APA or 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because of limitations on the type of remedy it envisions. Mandamus has traditionally been available only to "compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty ... [or] to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way .... 209 The Supreme Court has characterized a ministerial duty as a "duty [which] in a particular situation is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a positive command .... ,, 1 0 Thus, in order to invoke the mandamus remedy as a means for obtaining review of derogatory administrative discharges, the ex-serviceman must persuade a court that the government has failed to perform a ministerial, or nondiscretionary, duty which is owed him. Keeny v. Secretary of the Army 21 ' illustrates the limitations of this remedy. Keeny sought a writ of mandamus to require the Army Board for Correction of Military Records and the Secretary of the Army to reconsider his request that his discharge be changed from Undesirable to Honorable. The court denied mandamus relief on the ground that "reconsideration by the Board is clearly a matter of discretion with the Board and the Secretary of the Army." 2 12 "Clear legal duty" or "plain duty" is another formulation of the ministerial and nondiscretionary type of duty which must be owed to the plaintiff before a court will grant mandamus relief. 2 13 Two decisions in a context closely related to administrative discharge have interpreted the "clear legal duty" requirement to include failure to reclassify a punitive discharge which was awarded in a manner violative of due process. In Ashe v. McNamara 214 the court held that an ex-serviceman could compel the Board of Correction of Naval Records to consider and grant a request to reclassify a Dishonorable Discharge because the discharge was awarded by a court-martial proceeding lacking due process of law. 2 15 The court found the "plain duty" requirement satisfied since "it was . . . the duty of the Secretary and the Correction Board ... to treat as void a sentence thus unconstitutionally imposed." 21 6 In Smith v. McNamara 21 7 the Tenth Circuit reiterated the Ashe court's holding that the duty of the service Secretary and the Correction Board to reclassify an unconstitutionally awarded punitive discharge was enforceable by an action in the nature of mandamus under § 1361218 but deemed the court-martial proceeding leading to the discharge free from constitutional defect.
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While these decisions are not the only indications of a trend toward liberalization of mandamus standards, 220 it is nonetheless true, as Professor Davis concluded in 1970, that "authority for moving away from the mandamus tradition under § 1361 is scanty and unsatisfactory." 2 2 ' Thus reliance on § 1361 for jurisdiction in an administrative discharge challenge is hazardous unless the relief sought is performance of a manifestly nondiscretionary duty.
222 Whether courts will extend the doctrine of Ashe and Smith to the administrative discharge area, allowing servicemen derogatorily discharged pursuant to unconstitu- See, e.g., Bluth v. Laird, 435 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1970 Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1970 
Monetary Relief
Plaintiffs must resort to different jurisdictional bases when monetary relief is the desired remedy. The venerable doctrine of sovereign immunity 22 4 forbids unconsented suits against the sovereign where "the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain.
5
Only two statutes giving the sovereign's consent to be sued are appropriate for maintaining suits for monetary claims against the federal government based on a wrongful administrative discharge. First, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which allows it "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department .... "226 The Court of Claims has construed this statute to permit suits for money damages for wrongful discharge from military service. 22 Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, 375 (1945) , dismissing a complaint on the ground that the sovereign was an indispensable party in an action characterized by the Court as "an indirect effort to collect a debt allegedly owed by the government in a proceeding to which the government has not consented."
When an ex-serviceman seeks nonmonetary relief he may overcome the sovereign immunity barrier by invoking the blatant fiction that the officer who issued the discharge acted without authority and thus may be sued in his personal capacity. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.26 (1965) . But see DAvis (1970 Supp.) , supra note 70, § 27.07, at 932-33. Perhaps because it is based on an obvious fiction, the courts have not strictly adhered to the requirement that the officer sued be named personally. See, e.g., Smith v See, e.g., Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. CI. 1960) . The Court of Claims has no equity jurisdiction. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969). Thus, although it can award money judgments, it cannot make an enforceable adjudication of status, However, the court must in effect determine status in order to adjudicate monetary liability. In so doing it looks to § 10 of the APA to guide its review. See, e.g., Hertzog v. United States, 167 Ct. CI. 377, 384-85 (1964) . Interesting theoretical problems arising from this limitation are discussed in Meador, Judicial Determinations of Military Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293 , 1295 -1312 (1963 .
United States for money. In that year the section was amended to eliminate an exception which had prohibited suits in the district courts by officers or employees of the government to recover money allegedly due them as a result of their employment. 22 8 Congress failed, however, to delete another important restriction on jurisdiction under this provision: Jurisdiction remains limited to claims aggregating SO,O00 or less. 22 9 The Court of Claims thus remains the only forum for more substantial money claims against the government.
C. The Requirements of Finality and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Finality
While the propriety of judicial review of improper administrative discharge action has been clear since Harmon v. Brucker; 230 2 32 Thus, servicemen must wait at least until a discharge has been ordered before seeking judicial review.
Beard, however, did not consider whether judicial relief is available after discharge is ordered but before the purely mechanical act of separation from the service is carried out. 23 3 An analysis of the relevant provisions of the APA indicates that Beard should be limited to its holding and that physical separation pursuant to a discharge order 228. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970), was made applicable when the exception was deleted by 78 Stat. 699 (1964 ). See Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1969 ), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1970 924 (1967) , Beard was dismissed only because "the act complained of was uncertain" since discharge had not yet been ordered. The holding in Beard is clearly restricted to the proposition that a military discharge action is not final for purposes of judicial review until the discharge order has been issued; it does not support an exhaustion requirement.
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should not be an inflexible precondition to judicial review. Section 10(c) of the APA provides that agency action must be "final" before it may be reviewed.. 2 34 Although the legislative history of the APA makes it clear that "[f]inal action includes any effective or operative agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court, ' 2 3 3 the Act clearly does not limit judicial review to agency decisions which have been executed. 2 30 Indeed, § 10(d) of the APA explicitly provides that a court may "postpone the effective date of any agency action or preserve status or rights pending conclusion of [judicial] review proceedings" 2 37 in certain circumstances.
The ordering of a discharge ought to be considered "final" action for purposes of the APA. After discharge orders are issued, the services themselves, with one minor exception, 238 afford no further predischarge appeal opportunities. 39 The discharge action is complete except for the purely ministerial execution of the discharge order.
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From this it follows that courts have jurisdiction under the APA to entertain substantive challenges to discharge actions after discharge orders are issued and that courts may give remedial relief to persons still in service, as well as to those already discharged.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
That a court has jurisdiction to entertain a substantive challenge to a final order does not guarantee that it will necessarily do so. A 234. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970 [an] agency is final for purposes of review when it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process ... This formulation of finality complements the ripeness requirement of APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) , which implies that a person must suffer a "legal wrong" as a result of agency action before he may seek judicial review. It has recently been suggested that the less rigorous ripeness doctrine has supplanted, in cases to which it applies, the APA's somewhat more restrictive finality requirement. See Project-Federal Ad-,ninistrative Law Developments-1971 DUKE L.J. 115, 283-92 (1972 238. The Navy BCMR will consider an application from an officer whose performance is reported as 'unsatisfactory" for promotion purposes before his discharge. See note 58 supra.
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. See 32 C.F.R. § 41.7 (1972) ; pp. 40-42 supra. See Ogden v. Zuckert, 298 F.2d 312, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1961 ) (BCMR consideration is apart from the administrative process preceding finality, which process culminates in issuance of discharge order). The notion that an action may be "final" even though not yet effectuated is discussed in Duke Project, supra note 236, at 283-92. court in its discretion may withhold substantive relief pending exhaustion of administrative remedies.
240.
2 41 In the discharge context there are two bodies offering review opportunities-Discharge Review Boards and Boards for the Correction of Military Records (BCMR). 24 2 The case law in this area is somewhat murky, but courts tend to require exhaustion before they will substantively review discharge orders. Requiring exhaustion is questionable, however, in light of recent developments in analogous areas of military law and a reexamination of the irreparable injury doctrine in the exhaustion context.
To satisfy the exhaustion requirement a person already discharged may have to present appeals to both bodies. 243 For the person who has been ordered discharged but who has not yet been physically separated, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Normally neither body will consider his request for review.
24 4 If, however, a court issues a stay of discharge "pending" administrative review, a BCMR will review the discharge before it takes effect.
4 5
This outline of the procedural structure of administrative remedies as they relate to predischarge review does not, however, do full justice to the complexities which stem from the exhaustion doctrine. Confronted with the fact that two types of administrative remedies exist after discharge, one of which-review by a BCMR-may become available before discharge if a judicial stay is issued "pending" exhaustion, courts have taken four approaches to requests for predischarge judicial relief.
Some courts have refused to consider undertaking predischarge review and have instead required that a serviceman first suffer discharge and then exhaust all remedies which thereafter become available. 253 dispensed with the exhaustion requirement altogether holding that substantive predischarge review was available even though the serviceman had exhausted neither of the two types of remedies. Since the Ogden decision in 1961, however, no court has waived the requirement that a serviceman seeking review of an impending discharge exhaust at least those remedies available before discharge.
While it is somewhat difficult to extract consistent principles from the cases, most courts have required plaintiffs to exhaust all "avail- Supp. 169 (N.D. Cal. 1955 ). In at least one case, such a withholding of judicial relief was premised on the theory that the existence of postdischarge opportunities deprived the court of primary jurisdiction to grant predischarge relief. See McCurdy v. Zuckert, 359 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1966 ). This jurisdictional qualm seems unwarranted in light of the fact that the judicial doctrine of exhaustion clearly operates merely to give a court discretion to withhold relief and does not deprive it of jurisdiction. See note 241 supra.
247. 373 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U. S. 924 (1967 ). 248. 365 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1966 Sohm v. Fowler, 365 F.2d at 918. Sohm did not specify what it meant by the term "special circumstances." The Nelson court was more explicit, however, stating that "there are some cases in which postdischarge review may be inadequate by the very fact that the interim between discharge and board action harbors a potential for irreparable harm, notwithstanding possible reinstatement." 373 F.2d at 479. In such cases, presumably, the Nelson court would consider granting predischarge relief. Despite the "special circumstaices" language, both Sohm and Nelson did not in fact afford predischarge relief. The special circumstances restriction in Sohm may be in doubt since a recent case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ignored it in granting a civil service employee a stay of discharge pending administrative review without requiring such a showing. Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. , cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1494 ). 250. 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965 , afJ'g 230 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1964 able" administrative remedies. This relatively strict adherence to the exhaustion doctrine may be challenged on two grounds. First, exhaustion is inappropriate where appeal to the reviewing body would be futile. 2 4 Relevant to this argument are several recent cases in which the exhaustion requirement was waived in connection with habeas corpus petitions by service members claiming they should have been discharged as conscientious objectors. Typical is United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford25 where the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that exhaustion was not required where the only issue was whether a claim of entitlement to conscientious objector status was legally justified. Noting that the BCMR's had no expertise in legal matters and that resort to them would result in substantial delay to petitioner, whose claim the court found unquestionably valid, the court concluded that an exhaustion requirement would be inappropriate.
25
Brooks and the cases following it2 57 are, of course, distinguishable from administrative discharge cases. There is considerable doubt that CongTess intended BCMR's to function as part of the apparatus for reviewing conscientious objector claims, 2 8 while it is clear that a primary function of the BCMR's is to review claims arising from derogatory administrative discharges. 2 59 Nevertheless, the Brooks line of cases offers a broader rationale that is clearly relevant in the administrative discharge area: the notion that, because the BCMR's have no legal expertise, resort to them for purely legal claims of error should not be required.
0
The manner in which the two types of review boards evaluate legal issues underscores the futility of requiring exhaustion in such instances. The boards rarely determine legal questions themselves. Instead each board relies almost exclusively on the opinions of its service's Office of the Judge Advocate General. 261 Such reliance reduces "review" of the legal issue to a futile pro forma exercise. 262 In almost all instances a Judge Advocate officer will have reviewed the case before discharge and have found it to be legally justified. 20 3 A second look cannot be expected to be of much help to a petitioner. Thus, if a plaintiff bases his claim for relief on a question of law, he ought not be required to press postdischarge administrative appeals before bringing a court action.
2 6 4 This conclusion is merely a specific application of the general rule that only adequate administrative remedies need be exhausted before judicial relief may be sought. What issues are "legal" issues in this context is not settled. Several cases have held that challenges based on contentions that an armed service had failed to follow its own regulations in effecting discharge should first be presented to the postdischarge review boards. 266 But even if the "legal issues" category is not deemed to encompass regulatory matters, it surely applies to challenges bottomed on allegations of statutory or constitutional violations. 267 In such instances exhaustion before a BCMR or a Discharge Review Board should not be required.
If a challenge to a derogatory administrative discharge is brought on the basis of questions of fact, on the other hand, the exhaustion doctrine may be more appropriate, since appeal to postdischarge boards which have greater competence to decide factual questions, would not be futile.
Second, even if a court determines that resort to the review boards would not be futile, it still must consider a second factor in determining whether to require exhaustion: Exhaustion is inappropriate when it would entail unavoidable, irreparable injury to the aggrieved party pending administrative consideration. 2 8 There has not been perfect agreement as to what types of discharge inflict irreparable injury. The receipt of an Undesirable Discharge consistently satisfies the injury requirement. 269 Courts have disagreed, however, about the injury likely to result from a General Discharge. 27 0 Nevertheless, the harm associated with receipt of a General Discharge seems clearly irreparable.
27 1 The time necessary for exhausting postdischarge administrative review is considerable, 2 72 and during this period the exservice member must suffer the stigma of the discharge, an injury for which there can be no real compensation even if he eventually succeeds in having it held invalid. The conclusion which emerges is that exhaustion ought not be required where a serviceman must suffer the irreparable injury of a derogatory discharge in order to exhaust administrative remedies.
Propriety of Stays
As the previous discussion reveals, the issue of the propriety of stays pending exhaustion arises only where a serviceman challenges an administrative discharge that has been ordered but not yet executed.
Rather than granting such a serviceman remedial relief, a court may stay his discharge pending appeal to a BCMR. As noted earlier this body will not normally hear predischarge complaints unless a court grants a stay of discharge pending exhaustion.
In granting stays courts act in their discretion. In a leading 1964 decision, Covington v. Schwartz, 27 4 the court isolated four criteria which govern the granting of a stay pending predischarge administrative review: 27 5 (1) a demonstrated likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits in a district court after exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) irreparable injury to him if a stay is not granted pending administrative review; (3) no substantial harm to other interested parties (i.e., the military service concerned); and (4) no harm to the public interest.
7 6
In administrative discharge cases, the four criteria are not entitled to equal weight. While the relative importance of the first, third and fourth standards remains unclarified in the administrative discharge context, irreparable injury is clearly the crucial criterion. 27 7 Both the APA 27 8 and judicial precedent 279 require that irreparable injury be shown before a stay will issue. As discussed earlier, the award of an Undesirable Discharge has been universally acknowledged to generate irreparable injury and would clearly justify issuing a stay. The proposition that awarding a General Discharge also inflicts irreparable injury and would justify a stay may be somewhat less certain but rests on substantial support.
IV. Conclusion
This article began with the tale of Private Stapp, a draftee who received an Undesirable Discharge for harboring Marxist beliefs. It ends with a surmise: Had Stapp been fully aware of the jurisdictional and substantive barriers which impede judicial review of derogatory dis-
